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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past 10 years, non-regular employment has become a core labor policy issue 
in South Korea (hereafter Korea). The increase of non-regular employment has been a 
common phenomenon among industrialized economies. Likewise, this atypical employment 
has sharply proliferated in Korea, particularly along with changing corporate employment 
strategy after the economic crisis of 1998. The diffusion of non-regular labor has led to the 
growing segmentation of labor markets in the country, in that those workers suffer from 
inferior working conditions and vulnerable employment status, compared to regular workers. 
The intensifying trends of labor polarization, chiefly associated with the proliferation of non-
regular employment, has created a nationwide concern over social exclusion and economic 
discrimination of these marginal workers.  
Under this context, labor unions and NGOs have demanded the protective legislation to 
prevent the over-use and discrimination of non-regular labor, while employers and business 
associations have consistently insisted on institutional reforms for guaranteeing labor market 
flexibility and opposed any legal constraints on the use of these non-standard employment 
types. Accordingly, employment protection legislation for non-regular labor has been a 
polemic issue of industrial relations and national politics in Korea. A variety of actors, 
including labor unions, business associations, the governments, political parties, NGOs, and 
academics, have taken part in the contentious and complicated processes of labor politics 
concerning the enactment and revision of the non-regular labor protection legislation from 
the early 2000s up to the present. The processes of non-regular employment legislation has 
involved diverse arenas, such as policy consultation of the Tripartite Commission, top-level 
negotiations of industrial relations representatives, political negotiations at the Congress, 
and, sometimes, on-the-street confrontations. 
Our study is to examine the historical evolution of employment protection legislation for 
non-regular workers from the theoretical perspective of strategic-relational approach, 
formulated by Jessop (1990). The strategic-relational perspective helps decompose the 
complex processes of non-regular employment protection legislation, in which structural 
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contexts, actors’ interests and strategic choices, and various forms of interaction between 
those actors are embedded. This case study of Korea could offer a theoretical lens and 
analytical framework to explore and understand the labor politics of non-regular employment 
protection legislation, which becomes a controversial policy issues in developed and 
developing economies. Our paper is comprised of five chapters: Chapter Two discusses the 
strategic-relational theory and proposes an analytical framework to examine the labor politics 
of non-regular employment protection legislation. Chapter Three briefs the trends and 
present state of non-regular employment in Korea. Chapter Four delineates the historical 
evolution of labor politics concerning the non-regular employment protection legislation 
during the past 10 years, ranging from the People’s Government through the Participatory 
Government to the Conservative Government. Chapter Five concludes with some theoretical 
and policy implications drawing from our case study. 
      
II. STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE MAKING OF LAWS 
 
The strategic-relational perspective offers a useful lens to analyze the political process 
of law-making. This approach, reflecting the dialectic of structure and strategy (Jessop 1990), 
theorizes the state as form-determined social relations (Jessop 1990) or materialized 
cohesion of power relations (Poulantzas 1978), rather than reducing it to an apparatus of 
class domination or a neutral mediator. The neo-Marxist state theory rejects both economic 
determinism and class reductionism, and sheds light on strategic selectivity of the state. The 
state’s strategic selectivity has a dual meaning. First, the state is characterized as a site and 
an object, where strategic interaction and power relations of social actors take place and get 
embedded. The character of the state is form-determined by strategic interaction and power 
relations of social actors, entailing conflicts and bargaining, rather than shaped by the 
simplified logic of class domination or non-class consensus regime. Second, the state has a 
discriminating influence over political interaction of social actors, in that it privileges interests 
and strategic choice of a particular class or political group over those of others under the 
specific stage of politico-economic context (Jessop 1990).1 For instance, the ruling party, 
taking the state’s institutional power, tends to represent the interest of its political 
constituents and supporters, and bureaucrats, administering the state’s organs, foster their 
group inclination and vested interest to prefer particular policy action to others (Lee & Yoo 
 
1 This theoretical reasoning originates from Offe(1974)’s notion of ‘structural selectivity’, 
denoting the state’s biased policy-making inclination to safeguard the capitalist class interest. 
However, Jessop (1990), critical of Offe’s deterministic view, refines the state’s selectivity 
from the strategic-relational perspective, by replacing the structural class bias with the 
contingent one.  
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1998). In sum, the state could be seen as the relational arena of social actors’ strategic 
interaction as well as a ‘subjective inclination’ toward policy-making, from the theoretical 
viewpoint of strategic selectivity.       
At the same time, the strategic-relational perspective underscores the contingency and 
indeterminability embodied in the dynamics of the state’s policy-making, which involves 
intense interaction of various actors having conflicting interests and contesting strategies 
under the ‘fluid’ politico-economic context (Jessop 1990).2 The outcomes of the state’s 
policy-making are not pre-determined by the logic of class domination or economic structure 
at all, but uncertain and accidental and unexpected due to the inherent complexity of the 
dynamics. According to the theoretical reasoning of Jessop (1990), the indeterminacy and 
uncertainty of the state’s policy-making processes are basically attributed to complex 
interaction of different causal chains; however, they are furthered by a variety of ‘real’ factors, 
such as concerned actors’ bounded rationality, time constraints, the uncoordinated 
contention of ‘states within state’ or failed intra-organizational bargaining within major social 
groups like labor unions and business associations, and the happening of unforeseen 
domestic or overseas incidents. As a result, the state’s policy-making tends to become “a 
process without subject” (Poulantzas 1978). In particular, the democratic regime inevitably 
entails the uncertainty of institutionalized processes for interest intermediation (Przeworski 
1991). In this light, the strategic-relational approach could offer an insightful lens to ‘decode’ 
the complicated and contingent processes of the state’s policy-making.     
According to Foucault (1980), the law is a “normalized power structure”, in that it 
provides an institutional foundation for the state’s power exercise and normative authority to 
regulate socio-economic relations. Therefore, the making of laws is a key part of the state 
act. At the same time, social actors try to exert influence over the making process of laws 
and engage in an overt contest for safeguarding their own interests, since the law functions 
as a game rule to frame opportunity structure and power relations of those actors. 
Accordingly, the law is treated as a product of complicated political interaction among the 
concerned actors, from the strategic-relational perspective. Jessop (1990) points out that the 
law should not be viewed as apparatus of class domination, but as an autonomous entity, in 
which the interests and ‘externalized’ strategies of concerned parties are interwoven in a 
relational form of cohesion under the structural constraints of economic conditions and 
political power relations. In short, the politics of strategic relations is embedded in the 
processes of law-making.    
 
2 Jessop (1990) presents the theoretical notion of “contingent necessity”, a juxtaposition of 
contingency denoting ‘indeterminability’ and necessity signifying an assumption that 
“everything that happens is caused”.    
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Labor laws, which set an institutional framework to regulate labor market exchange and 
industrial relations interplay, have been a contested terrain of the capitalist state, manifesting 
interest conflicts between employers and labor unions (or workers). Workers or labor unions 
intend to protect their interests and enhance the terms and conditions of working life through 
the making of labor laws. In contrast, employers and business associations oppose the 
making of labor laws to incur increasing labor costs and restrain their discretion as to the 
purchase and deployment of labor power. Under the globalizing context, employers have 
demanded the loosening of employment protection legislation on the pretext of enhancing 
corporate competitiveness, which is often faced with organized labor’s strong opposition. 
Accordingly, the making of labor laws tends to entail acute interest conflicts between 
employers associations and workers organizations. The government engages in this 
contested process, with its selective stance toward the making of labor laws, whether pro-
labor or pro-business or as an in-between mediator. Civil activist groups (NGOs), which are 
concerned about the worsening quality of working life, may take active part in the (re-
)making process of labor laws, particularly where labor unions have low organizational 
coverage and weak social leverage. In addition, academics and media also participate in the 
contest of public discourse concerning the making of labor laws by making a voice in 
accordance with their own ideological inclination. These actors bring distinct interest and 
strategic intention into the making of labor laws, and get involved in the interactive process 
of policy consultation, whether in an institutionalized form or informal manner. They 
sometimes take a variety of strategic action, such as labor unions’ general strike, NGO’s 
making policy issues public, and business groups’ co-opting approach, in order to turn the 
making of labor laws to their advantage. In this political process, each actor may experience 
intra-group split and strife, making the interaction more complicated.  
The making of labor laws goes through two stages. The first is the stage of legislative 
agenda setting, where three parties and other social actors engage in intense interaction to 
determine whether to enact the law and how to devise it. The second is the stage of 
enactment or revision at the Congress, where political parties and the government get 
involved in negotiations on the detailed contents of legislation. The first stage is 
accompanied with policy consultation and overt confrontations among concerned actors, 
while the second stage is basically characterized as party politics, which is often affected by 
those actors’ mobilized pressure and public discourse outside the Congress. In the two 
stages, the externalized strategies of social actors, including the government, and political 
parties are conditioned by contextual structures, comprised of economic situations and 
socio-political climate. Under a particular economic-political circumstance, some actors have 
a big advantage over others in exerting influence on the making process of labor laws. Along 
with the changing situations (i.e. economic fluctuations, political scandals, and unexpected 
social incidents), however, the strategic (and power) relations of actors in the bargaining 
process could be reversed. Thus, the strategic selectivity of social actors (and political 
parties) is structured by those contextual factors, in that the scope of their strategic choice is 
chiefly constrained and reshaped by the external conditions.    
[Figure 1] illustrates an analytical framework for examining the political processes of 
non-regular employment protection legislation from the strategic-relational perspective.3  
 
[Figure 1] Framework for Analyzing the Politics of Employment Protection Legislation 
 
 
 
III. TRENDS AND STATE OF NON-REGULAR EMPLOYMENT IN KOREA 
 
As exemplified in [Figure 2], non-regular employment, which had been a substantial part 
of the working population in the 1990s, soared sharply after the financial crisis of 1997-1998 
in Korea. Against the backdrop of the economic crisis, many firms downsized regular 
employees and re-filled their positions with non-regular workers. [Figure 3] illustrates how 
Korean firms increased the use of non-regular labor and reduced the payroll of regular 
employees in the early 2000s. As a consequence, the share of contingent workforce, 
comprised of temporary and daily labor estimated by the Economically Active Population 
                                            
3 Although the enforcement and judicial interpretation of labor laws could be similarly 
analyzed from the strategic-relational perspective, this paper focuses on the making process 
of non-regular employment protection laws.    
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Survey, increased from 41.8% in 1995 to 52.1% in 2000. The size of non-regular 
employment has risen from 26.8% in 2001 up to 37.0% in 2004 and down to 33.4% in early 
2009, according to the official estimation of the Korean government, which started 
conducting the Economically Active Population- Supplementary Survey from 2001, along 
with the growing social concern over the non-regular labor issue. By contrast, the labor union 
circle has presented quite different estimation, insisting that the majority of wage workforce 
has been under the non-regular employment, ranging from 55.7% in 2001 to 52.3% in early 
2009. As such, there has been an intense debate on how to estimate the size of non-regular 
workforce, drawing upon the Economic Active Population-Supplementary Survey conducted 
yearly between 2001 and 2006 and bi-annually from 2007 on by the National Statistics Office. 
As [Table 1] illustrates, the difference in the estimation of non-regular employment between 
the government and the labor union depends upon how to categorize workers under 
recurrent renewal of temporary employment contracts (category ①). The Tripartite 
Commission, which was involved in the design of the Economically Active Population (EAP) 
– Supplementary Survey, reached an agreement regarding the definition of non-regular 
employment in July 2002. According to the Tripartite Commission’s definition, the 
government has estimated the size of non-regular employment by drawing on the official 
indicators (②+③) of EAP- Supplementary Survey. The Korea Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU), which was excluded in policy consultation of the Tripartite Commission, has insisted 
that temporary workers under the recurrent employment contract have to be included in the 
estimation of non-regular employment, in that their employment and working conditions are 
as vulnerable and inferior as those of other non-regular workers (Kim 2009). As of March 
2009, the number of the recurrent temporary workers amount to over 3 million and 18.8% of 
the wage working population. Given the differing estimation made by the government and 
the labor circle, the share of non-regular employment has declined over recent years, which 
is chiefly attributable to the implementation of labor policy and employment protection 
legislation to protect those vulnerable workers between 2005 and 2006. 
 
 [Figure 1] Trends of Non-regular Employment in Korea  
 
(Source) Economically Active Population & Supplementary Survey in each year   
(Note): Contingent labor is estimated as the averaged number of each year; Non-regular 
employment by the government and labor union is estimated as of August each year, but 
2009, when the number is calculated as of March.    
 
[Figure 2] Changes in Regular and Non-regular Employment in Korea 
 
(Source) Economically Active Population – Supplementary Survey in August each year   
 
[Table 1] Categorization of Employment Types in Economically Active Population Survey 
EAP-Supplementary Survey 
 
Regular Non-regular 
Total 
EAP Permanent ① 7,687 (47.8%) ② 1,487 (9.2%) ①+② 9,174 (57.1%)  
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Survey  
 
Contingent ④ 3,015 (18.8%) ③ 3,887 (24.2%) ③+④ 6,902 (42.9%) 
Total ①+④ 10,702 (66.6%) ②+③ 5,374 (33.4%) 16,076 (100.0%) 
Note: Non-regular employment includes the fixed-term labor, on-call labor, part-time labor, 
dispatched labor, contracted labor, home work, and dependent self-employed. Government’s 
estimation =②+③; Union Circle’s estimation = ②+③+④ 
 
Non-regular workers in Korea have suffered from differentiated compensation and 
inferior working conditions. As illustrated in [Figure 4], the discrepancy of hourly wages 
between regular and non-regular workers has been widening for both male (from 75.9% in 
2001 to 64.4% in 2008) and female (from 100.2% to 85.2% during the same period). The 
wage differentials between regular and non-regular workers are even larger for male than for 
female. As summarized in [Table 2], a large number of non-regular workers in Korea have 
been commonly excluded from statutory social welfare schemes and fringe benefits provided 
by firms. Over 60% of non-regular workforce is still excluded from social and legal protection, 
such as employment insurance, national pension, overtime work payment, and paid 
vacations, although the coverage of the social and statutory protection for non-regular 
workers has slowly expanded over the recent years. Non-regular workers are also excluded 
from labor unions’ protection, as exemplified by the fact that only below 3% of them are 
unionized (Lee & Kwon 2008). Moreover, many studies have shown that non-regular jobs in 
Korea are not a "stepping stone", but a trap, in that non-regular workers are entrapped in 
their marginal jobs, rather than being able to move upward to regular position (Nam & Kim 
2000; Han & Jang 2000).  
 
[Figure 4] Trends in Wage Gap Between Regular and Non-regular Workers in Korea 
(Hourly Wages in Korean Won, Regular Employee=100) 
 
8 
 
9 
 
 (Source) Economically Active Population – Supplementary Survey, each year 
 
[Table 2] Social Protection of Regular and Non-Regular Workers in Korea  
Regular Workers Non-regular Workers 
 
2004 2008 2004 2008 
Employment Insurance 61.5% 65.8% 36.1% 39.2% 
Medical Insurance 73.8% 78.0% 40.1% 41.5% 
National Pension 72.5% 77.3% 37.5% 39.0% 
Severance Payment 67.4% 74.5% 31.3% 35.6% 
Overtime Work Payment 65.8% 53.5% 27.5% 28.0% 
Paid Vacations 55.8% 65.4% 22.2% 33.6% 
Bonuses 58.2% 71.2% 24.5% 27.9% 
(Source) Economically Active Population-Supplementary Survey 
 
As such, non-regular employment in Korea, which has proliferated during the last 10 
years, has become a core policy issue, due to its over-use and discrimination. Under this 
context, such social actors as labor unions, business associations, the government, and 
NGOs have got involved in a strategic-relational interaction for the making of non-regular 
labor protection legislation since early 2000s.  
 
IV. EVOLUTION OF LABOR POLITICS CONCERNING NON-REGULAR 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
 
In this section, we delineate how labor politics concerning non-regular employment 
protection legislation has evolved over the past three governments, by focusing on strategic-
relational interaction between the governments and other social actors.. 
 
(1) The period of People’s Government (1998~2002) 
Non-regular employment drew social attention as a focal issue of industrial relations in 
early 1998, when the People’s Government, led by President Kim, Dae-Jung, enacted the 
dispatched workers protection law under the economic crisis. This law, which failed to be 
implemented by the former Civil Government (1993~1997) due to labor unions’ strong 
resistance, was made as part of the social pact made in February 1998 and allowed 
employers to legally use the dispatched labor, which was prohibited until then, in some 
occupations and industrial sectors designated by the positive list. At the time, labor unions, 
whose strategic reaction was constrained under the contextual pressure of the economic 
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crisis, could not help accepting the government’s reform drive to legislate the dispatched 
workers protection law in accordance with the IMF’s economic restructuring guideline to 
promote labor market flexibility as its condition of relief loan (Lee & Yoo 1998). The KCTU, 
whose leadership endorsing the social pact stepped down by the non-confidence resolution 
of local union representatives, showed the post-factum opposition against the introduction of 
the dispatched workers protection law, but was unable to stop the legislation. However, it is 
noteworthy that the government enacted this law as part of a “big deal” to exchange labor 
rights enhancement (for teachers and public servants) for labor market flexibility (allowing 
layoffs and the use of dispatched labor) (Lee & Yoo 2001). The government, aware that 
labor unions, particularly the KCTU, blocked the legislation of labor market flexibility by 
mobilizing powerful general strike action in the former administration, tried to resort to the 
process of social dialogue involving union representatives under the context of the economic 
crisis.      
Korean firms launched massive downsizing of regular employees under the economic 
crisis, and expanded the use of non-regular labor along with the rapid economic recovery 
from the second half of 1999. As a result, non-regular employment sharply proliferated, as 
illustrated in [Figure 1], and their discriminated working conditions created the growing 
concern among labor unions and NGOs. In this context, a number of non-regular workers, 
such as daily laborers, contracted workers, and dependent self-employed, tried to organize 
their own labor unions4 and engaged in intense collective action against their employers’ 
suppression. With the mounting concern over the non-regular labor, the Joint Committee for 
protecting the labor rights of non-regular workers and abolishing the discrimination, 
comprised of two national centers of trade unions (FKTU and KCTU) and 24 civil and labor 
NGOs, was formed in May 2000 and demanded the non-regular employment protection 
legislation in September of the year. Confronted with the increase of non-regular labor-
related disputes and the escalating pressure of labor unions and civil NGOs, the government 
announced its first policy proposal concerning non-standard workers in October. However, 
the government’s proposal was severely criticized by both labor unions and business 
associations having contesting interest, so that it failed to put into effect.  
Meanwhile, the Tripartite Commission also adopted the non-regular labor issue as its 
agenda of policy consultation. The Economic-Social Subcommission of the Tripartite 
Commission began discussing about the fact-finding and policy-making of non-regular 
employment in April 2000, yet made little progress, mainly owing to the wide interest gap 
 
4 During the year of 2000, 91 labor unions were organized to represent around 36 thousand 
non-regular workers, and 844 non-regular workers obtained the regular employment status 
through their bitter struggles (Park & Kim 2002).  
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between labor unions and business associations. As the Joint Committee raised its public 
voice demanding the non-regular employment protection legislation and the FKTU strongly 
demanded the forming of a subcommission to handle the non-regular labor issues from early 
2001, the Tripartite Commission finally established the Non-regular Labor Policy 
Subcommission in July 2001, comprised of six representatives of the three parties – labor 
unions, business associations, and the government – and six academics representing public 
interest. Because the KCTU withdrew its participation in the Tripartite Commission since 
early 1999, it was excluded from the policy consultation process of the Non-regular Labor 
Policy Subcommission. Therefore, the labor politics concerning the non-regular employment 
protection legislation took a form of dual process: on the one hand, a policy negotiation 
process inside the Tripartite Commission, and, on the other, a mobilizing process of public 
pressure by the KCTU and civil NGOs outside the Commission.  
The Non-regular Labor Policy Subcommission, which held 114 meetings in total, 
including workshops and public conferences, and conducted field interview research during 
the period of its operation (from July 2001 to July 2003), reached an agreement regarding 
the criteria of statistical estimation for non-regular employment and the strengthening of 
workplace supervision and expansion of social insurances for non-regular workers in May 
2002. The Subcommission also discussed about the legislative recommendations for the 
four types of non-regular employment – fixed-term, part-time, dispatched, and dependent 
self-employed (named as special employment), yet was not able to produce an additional 
agreement until the end of the People’s government, due to sharp and persistent interest 
difference of the union and business representatives. [Table 3] summarizes the public 
representatives’ policy recommendation as well as the contending positions of labor unions 
[Table 3] Legislative Proposals by Concerned Parties in the Policy-Consultation Process of the Tripartite Commission 
 Union Representative Business Representative Public Representative 
Fixed-term - Regulating the use of fixed-term labor 
only for limited valid reasons 
- Imposing the duration limit of fixed-term 
employment for two years 
- Treating fixed-term workers exceeding 
two years as permanently employed 
- Stipulating the principle of the equal pay 
for equal value-work  
- Opposing the stipulation of limited valid 
reasons for the use of fixed-term labor  
- Allowing the duration of the employment 
contract for three years 
- Opposing employer’s obligation to turn 
fixed-term workers into a permanent 
position 
- Opposing the stipulation of the “equal pay 
for equal value-work” principle 
- Introducing the time limit of fixed-term 
contract and treating fixed-term workers 
exceeding the limit as permanently 
employed 
- Stipulating prohibition of discrimination 
- Introducing employer’s obligation  to 
elucidate working conditions in a written 
form 
 
Part-time - Setting a separate limit of daily working 
time for part-time workers 
- Introducing the extra work allowance for 
part-time workers 
- Opposing the introduction of part-time 
working time limit and extra allowance  
- Stipulating the principle of proportionate 
protection and prohibition of 
discrimination for part-time workers 
- Paying extra work allowance for 
exceeding the pre-defined limit of part-
time work 
- Introducing employer’s obligation to make  
written employment contract 
Dispatched - Limiting the use of dispatched labor only 
for professional jobs 
- Allowing the use of dispatched workers 
only for two years  
- Prohibiting dispatched workers from doing 
the same job over two years 
- Changing the positive list for the use of 
dispatched labor into the negative list 
- Abolishing the time limit of dispatched 
labor in use 
- Allowing to use dispatched labor in the 
same job without time limit 
- Regulating the illegal use of dispatched 
labor by letting employers employ them in  
regular jobs 
- Stipulating prohibition of discrimination 
- Introducing tripartite council to adjust the 
coverage of dispatched labor in use 
- Promoting labor rights of dispatched 
workers at their working sites  
Dependent  
Self-employed 
- Guaranteeing the legal entity of worker for 
dependent self-employed in the trade 
union law  
- Extending the definition of worker in the 
labor standards law 
- Opposing the recognition of worker entity 
for dependent self-employed in the trade 
union and the labor standards laws 
- Resolving the issues of dependent self-
employed by the civil or commercial laws 
- Proposing the special law to guarantee 
quasi-workers (dependent self-employed)  
labor rights to organize and bargain 
- Suggesting additional policy-consultation 
to prepare for labor and social protection  
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and business associations with regards to the non-regular employment protection legislation. 
In short, union representatives insisted on strictly regulating the use of non-regular labor and 
prohibiting its discriminatory working conditions, whereas business representatives strongly 
opposed the introduction of any regulation to restrict employers’ discretion to employ at will 
and cause additional labor costs to employers. In the policy-consultation process, the 
government didn’t show a clear stance on the legislative direction concerning non-regular 
employment, nor made active effort to mediate between labor unions and business 
associations. The KCTU and non-regular workers unions pressured the policy consultation 
process of the Tripartite Commission by mobilizing a number of campaigns demanding the 
abolition of non-regular employment.  
 
(2) The period of Participatory Government (2003~2007) 
Under the new Participatory Government, led by President Rho, Moo-Hyun, the Non-
regular Labor Policy Subcommission tried to finalize its policy recommendation regarding the 
non-regular employment protection legislation, but failed to reach a tripartite agreement due 
to uncompromising interest discrepancy between union and business representatives. After 
all, it concluded with a policy recommendation proposal addressed only by the six 
representatives of public interests in May 2003. As illustrated in [Table 3], the public 
representatives’ recommendation was a compromise proposal of the middle ground to 
regulate the over-use and discrimination of non-regular labor. Accordingly, the 
recommendation was rejected by both labor unions and business associations; however, it 
became a significant ground of reference for the following tripartite negotiation with regard to 
non-regular employment protection legislation. After the closing of the Non-regular Policy 
Subcommission, the Tripartite Commission decided re-establishing a subcommission to 
discuss about the legislative issues of dependent self-employed in September 2003 by 
accepting the public representatives’ suggestion. The so-called Special Employment Policy 
Subcommission provided a variety of activities to devise legislative solutions for dependent 
self-employed until the mid of 2006, yet produced little compromise between union and 
business representatives.     
The Participatory Government didn’t have a clear plan to bring in new legislation to 
resolve the issues of non-regular employment at the beginning of its regime. When the new 
government took office in early 2003, its long-term policy program didn’t include any 
legislative plan for non-regular employment protection, except introducing the statutory 
regulation to guarantee the equal treatment of those workers. During 2003, civil NGOs 
expressed stronger voice on the vulnerable and discriminated situation of non-regular 
workers, and labor unions organized a series of nationwide campaigns for demanding 
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statutory protection of non-regular employment. Under the pressure of NGOs and labor 
unions, the government began making active legislative effort from the early 2004 5 . 
Interestingly, however, the government, which was expected to take a pro-labor policy 
stance toward non-regular labor issues, showed a pro-business position in making the non-
regular employment legislation. This was associated with the worsened economic situation 
and the failed attempt to build cooperative relationship with the KCTU. In 2003 and 2004, the 
country’s economy fell into a grave slump, and the government’s effort to induce the KCTU 
to re-join the Tripartite Commission was unsuccessful by the national center’s weak 
leadership and rank-and-file’s engrained mistrust toward the Commission. 6  Under this 
context, the government made public a legislative proposal concerning the protection of 
three non-regular employment types - fixed-term, part-time, and dispatched – in September 
2004. The government’s proposal appeared closer to the position of business associations, 
rather than to that of labor unions, as illustrated in [Table 4]. The government’s proposal 
arouse the strong opposition of the two national centers of trade unions – FKTU and KCTU -, 
which agreed on campaigning joint countermoves to block the government-initiated 
legislation and joined a nationwide committee to prevent the retrogressive revision of labor 
laws and protect the labor rights of non-regular workers, comprised of 101 civil and labor 
NGOs.7 Meanwhile, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which made its first entry into the 
Congress by gaining ten seats in the 2004 general election8, put forward a counter-proposal 
to limit the use and discrimination of fixed-term and dispatched labor to a certain degree. 
The government handed in the proposal of non-regular employment legislation to the 
Congress in November 2004. However, it was not passed under the strong opposition of 
labor unions and mounting criticism of public opinion, making the ruling party inactive in 
enacting the non-regular employment laws  
 
[Table 4] Proposals Concerning Non-regular Employment Legislation in 2004 
 
5 In February 2004, the Participatory Government established the non-regular employment 
policy office in the Ministry of Labor, which was in charge of policy-making concerning non-
regular labor issues. This office was dissolved by the Conservative Government in early 
2009,    
6 Many activists and union members of the KCTU have blamed the Tripartite Commission as 
the ringleader to have the massive lay-off clause legislated in the early 1998.   
7 Immediately after the Ministry of Labor announced its proposal of non-regular employment 
legislation, non-regular workers representatives of the two national centers engaged in sit-
down protest at the ruling party office for a week. In addition, a number of academics and 
lawyers called a press conference to demand the withdrawal of the government’s legislative 
proposal of non-regular employment at the time. 
8 In the general election held in April 2004, the Democratic Labor Party obtained 13.1% of 
national voting. 
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 KTCU & DLP Business Government 
Equal 
Treatment 
- Stipulation of “Equal Pay 
for Equal Work” principle  
- Prohibition of 
discrimination by 
employment type 
- Opposing the stipulation of 
“Equal Pay for Equal Work” 
principle  
 
- Opposing the principle of 
“Equal Pay for Equal Work”; 
stipulating the prohibition of 
irrational discrimination 
- Introducing the corrective 
procedure of discrimination 
Fixed-term - Allowing the use of fixed-
term labor only for rational 
reasons 
- Limiting the length of fixed-
term employment to 1 year 
- Opposing the limit of fixed-
term employment for 
reasons of use 
- Allowing the use of fixed-
term labor by three years 
- Opposing the limit of fixed-
term employment for 
reasons of use 
- Allowing the use of fixed-
term labor by three years 
(temps exceeding 3 years to 
turn into regular position) 
Dispatched - Abolishing the dispatched 
worker law 
- Punishing illegal use of 
dispatched workers by 
making them regular status 
- Strengthening the 
accountability of employers 
using dispatched labor 
- Expanding the eligible 
sectors for the use of 
dispatched labor by 
adopting the negative list  
- Opposing the suspension 
period  
- Adopting the negative list 
of dispatched labor (except 
manufacturing) 
- Introducing the suspension 
period to prohibit the use of 
dispatched workers in the 
same job  
 
The pending situation of the non-regular employment legislation in the Congress 
remained unchanged and even became worse in 2005, although the government attempted 
to enforce its legislative plan in a unilateral manner. In March of the year, the presidents of 
the two national centers announced a joint statement to demand the resumption of social 
dialogue, including the KCTU, for discussing about the compromising solution of non-regular 
employment legislation, and to warn the government and the ruling party that their unilateral 
enforcement would face strong general strike action of labor unions. In April 2005, the 
National Human Rights Commission addressed its official statement endorsing the labor 
union’s position, thereby damaging the authenticity of the government’s proposal. Between 
April and May, when the government tried to enforce the legislation in a unilateral way, the 
leaders of the two national centers engaged in hunger strike and called general strike. In 
July 2005, the FKTU decided withdrawing from the Tripartite Commission for declaring its 
intention to protest against the government’s legislative proposal. 9  As a result, the 
government, faced with the persistent opposition of labor unions and civil NGOs, failed to 
pass its legislative proposal in the Congress and finally gave up the hard-line position to 
enforce the legislation at the end of 2005. 
                                            
9 In addition, the FKTU’s withdrawal from the Tripartite Commission was attributed to the 
death of a union officer at a rally to demand the labor rights of dependent self-employed and 
the pro-business position of the Minister of Labor, Dae-Hwan Kim.  
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From the early 2006, the government began approaching the non-regular employment 
legislation in a changing manner of resorting to the ‘soft’ process of social dialogue. In 
February, President Rho replaced the pro-business Minister Kim, Dae-Hwan with an ex-
labor lawyer, Lee, Sang-Soo, and the government made active efforts for resuming the 
policy consultation process involving the FKTU and the KEF (Korea Employers Federation). 
In order to induce the FKTU to take part in the policy consultation process, the Ministry of 
Labor embraced some of union’s demands, including the term limit of two years for the use 
of fixed-term worker and the retention of positive list for the use of dispatched labor in its 
legislative proposal, in the face of the opposition of economic ministries. The FKTU’s 
decision to return to the Tripartite Commission in February 2006 dissolved the coalition of 
the two national centers opposing the government-initiated legislation 10 , and thereafter 
created an uncompromising schism between the two national centers and among civil NGOs 
and labor activists groups in the making process of non-regular employment laws. The focal 
source of contention between the two national centers was how to approach the legislation: 
the FKTU and civil NGOs took a pragmatic stance by insisting that it would be better to 
introduce partial statutory regulations on the use and discrimination of non-regular 
employment under the given context of tripartite power relations, than to play the “all or 
nothing” game, whereas the KCTU and labor activist groups showed a strict position 
opposing the legislation against their principles to prohibit the irrational use of non-regular 
labor. A good example illustrative of the distinct stances of the two sides is how to regulate 
the use of fixed-term labor. The FKTU accepted the term limit of two years as a means to 
regulate the use of fixed-term labor without the specification of usable reasons, by taking 
employers’ tough opposition to new regulation into account. By contrast, the KCTU 
demanded that the use of fixed-term labor is allowed only for some specific reasons (i.e. 
regular employees’ short-term vacancies due to pregnancy and sickness, seasonal business, 
temporary projects, and intended to oppose any legislation, in case that their demand was 
not accepted.            
Although the FKTU rejoined the policy-consultation process concerning the non-regular 
employment legislation, the government was not able to produce a tripartite agreement to 
compromise on this legislative issue in between the FKTU and the KEF having a wide gap of 
differing positions. As the policy-consultation of the Tripartite Commission proved fruitless, 
the government tossed the legislative issue to the Congress in the fall of 2006. Between 
 
10 The dissolution of the FKTU-KCTU coalition was associated with the sudden resignation 
of the KCTU President Lee, Soo-Ho, which was active in building cooperative relationship 
with the FKTU in October 2005. President Lee resigned his position, since he felt 
accountable for the corruption of his senior officer.    
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October and November 2006, the ruling party invited six representatives – the FKTU, the 
KCTU, the KEF, the KCCI (Korea Chamber of Commerce & Industry), Ministry of Labor, 
Tripartite Commission – in the Congress and attempted to make a final compromise for the 
non-regular employment legislation. During a series of the tripartite meetings, those 
representatives made some progress in reaching accord on many legislative clauses, but 
didn’t resolve the key issues (i.e. how to regulate the use of fixed-term labor and penalize 
the illegal use of dispatched labor), mainly due to the KCTU’s stubborn stance. As the 
tripartite meetings failed to produce an agreement, the ruling party began negotiating with 
the major opposition party about the passage of two non-regular employment laws. Since all 
representative of tripartite negotiation but the KCTU gave an implicit understanding to the 
final legislative proposal, as summarized in [Table 5], the ruling and major opposition parties 
agreed upon the enactment of those laws.11 However, the KCTU and the Democratic Labor 
Party (DLP) rallied a series of campaigns, including general strikes, to block the passage of 
the non-regular employment laws. Confronted with stiff opposition of the KCTU and the DLP, 
the ruling party chose to enforce the passage of the laws brought up by the authority of the 
Chair of the Congress in the end of November 2006. The laws were put into effect in a 
gradual way by taking the firm size into account: effective for firms having 300 employees 
and more from July 2007, firms having 100∼299 employees from July 2008, and firms 
having less than 100 employees from July 2009.12 As such, the non-regular employment 
legislation, reflecting a compromise of tripartite interests, could be completed through 
intense political processes of 5 years. 
Prior to July 2007, when the laws started being put into effect, many large firms turned 
their temporary (fixed-term) workers into regular or permanent employees. However, a few 
firms, like E-land (department store), Korail (public transportation) and Giryung Electronics 
(manufacturing), undertook a massive lay-off of fixed-term workers or replaced them with 
contracted labor, thereby creating a grave social concern over the side-effects of the non-
regular employment laws. In this context, the Tripartite Commission formed the 
Subcommission on Non-regular Workers for discussing about the follow-up policy-making to 
deal with the side-effects and deficiencies of the legislation in May 2007. Note that the 
Participatory Government took active policy action to carry out a series of special 
 
11 The major opposition party, the Grand National Party, which took a pro-business 
conservative position speaking for the interest of business associations, did not oppose the 
ruling party’s legislative proposal, since the business associations gave implicit endorsement 
to it. 
12 The non-regular employment laws are not applied to small firms having less than 5 
employees. 
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investigation into illegal use of dispatched labor at manufacturing firms13 and convert non-
regular workers to permanent status in the public sector during its term.          
 
[Table 5] Key Contents of Non-regular Employment Laws 
 The Existing Laws Non-regular Employment Laws 
 
Prohibition of 
Discrimination - No clause 
- Introduction of ‘prohibiting discrimination’ 
clause 
- Labor Relations Commission’s corrective 
action of discriminative cases Fixed-term 
Renewal of 
Employment 
Contract 
- No clause  
- 2 year limit on the use of fixed-term labor 
(Fixed-term workers exceeding two years 
limit regarded as permanently employed) 
Prohibition of 
Discrimination - No clause - The same clauses as fixed-term labor 
Part-time 
Extra Work 
Payment 
- No clause for part-time 
workers 
- Adoption of the limit of extra work (weekly 
12 hours)  
Prohibition of 
Discrimination - No clause - The same clauses as fixed-term labor 
Duration  & 
Eligible Sector of 
Labor dispatching 
- Limit of two years  
- Positive List 
- The same limit of two years 
- Retention of Positive List, yet expanded Dispatched 
Labor 
Treatment of 
dispatched 
workers used over 
two years 
- Legally regarding the 
workers as employed in 
regular jobs 
- Enforcing employers to employ over-used 
dispatched workers 
- Enforcing employers to employ dispatched 
workers in illegal use 
 
 
(3) The period of Conservative Government (2008~the present) 
President Lee, Myung-Bak, who won the presidential election in December 2007, 
announced the so-called MBnomics, including an extensive de-regulation plan, at the 
beginning of his administration. The advent of the Conservative Government, which gained 
the absolute majority of the Congress in the general election of May 2008, signaled the 
formation of business-led power relations by giving big advantage to employers and 
business groups. This new government, which made clear its pro-business administrative 
direction, collected business associations’ demand on deregulation of labor policy area, 
including the non-regular employment laws, and made a public pledge to undertake 
aggressive policy-making for promoting labor market flexibility. Moreover, the economic 
slump, triggered by the financial crisis of the United States taking place in the fall of 2008, 
provided a specious pretext for the government’s attempt to deregulate the non-regular 
                                            
13 The government’s special investigation became a source of complaints from labor unions 
and NGOs, since it ultimately gave many large firms an indulgence to their illegal use of 
dispatched labor, which is not allowed in the manufacturing sector.  
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employment laws. In particular, the Ministry of Labor has propagated the possibility of 
massive dismissal of fixed-term workers who reach the term limit of two years by July 2009 
in order to justify its move to revise the non-regular employment laws. The Ministry argued in 
the early 2009 that around one million fixed-term workers would lose their jobs without 
extending the term limit to 4 years in the laws.14  
However, the government’s move to revise the non-regular employment laws has been 
confronted with strong opposition from labor unions, opposition parties, and civil NGOs. The 
government’s rationale for revising the laws is entirely refuted by those opposing groups. 
The opposing groups have insisted that the non-regular employment laws have to some 
extent contributed in the conversion of fixed-term workers to permanent employees since the 
enforcement of the laws in July 2007, and that the government’s speculation about the 
dismissed size of fixed-term workers is grossly exaggerated by taking advantage of the 
present situation of economic crisis (Eun 2009). 15  They have demanded the further 
strengthening of protective regulations on non-regular employment, rather than deregulating 
of the existing laws. As summarized in [Table 6], the reform agenda commonly proposed by 
the opposing groups includes the enhancement of the complaining procedure for 
discriminative cases, the provision of financial incentives for firms converting non-regular 
workers to regular employees, the expanded accountability of employers using dispatched 
labor, and the introduction of additional statutory regulations over in-house subcontracting 
and dependent self-employed workers16. By contrast, the government have rejected these 
demands and tried to deregulate the existing laws by extending the term limit of fixed-term 
from two year to four years and the expanding the eligible sectors for the use of dispatched 
labor, even though its deregulatory action is short for what business associations have 
demanded. In accordance with the government’s deregulatory policy direction, the 
Subcommission on Non-regular Workers in the Tripartite Commission has changed its 
agenda of policy consultation from the regulatory solutions to tackle the side-effects of the 
existing laws to the deregulatory revision of them.  
 
14 Yet, the estimated number of the government reduced to around 700 thousand by June. 
15 Many academics, critical of the government’s position to deregulate the non-regular 
employment laws, estimated that 273 thousand fixed-term workers at maximum would reach 
the statutory term limit for next 12 months, which shows a wide discrepancy with the 
government’s estimation. It is noteworthy that the number of fixed-term workers sharply 
dropped from 2,614 thousands in March 2007 to 2,293 thousands in March 2008, yet has 
increased to 2,560 thousands in March 2009. This changing trend of fixed-term employment 
appears to reflect employers’ reaction to the government’s deregulatory move (Eun 2009).  
16 In March 2009, a local president of the Cargo Driver Union protested to his death against 
the government’s refusal to recognize labor rights of dependent self-employed workers. His 
death has created growing tension between the government and the dependent self-
employed workers unions. 
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[Table 6] Key Issues Concerning Non-regular Employment Legislation in 2009 
 Union & NGO Business Government 
Prohibition of 
Discrimination 
- Expansion of complainant 
to labor union and worker 
representatives 
- Expansion of comparable 
jobs to discriminative case 
- Extension of complaining 
period for discriminative 
case to 6 months 
- Opposing any revision to 
strengthen the complaining 
procedure of discriminative 
case 
- Not accepting the 
expansion of complainants 
and comparable jobs 
- Extending complaining 
period to 6 months 
 
Fixed-term - Retaining imposition of 
the 2 year limit on the use 
of fixed-term employment  
- Provision of incentives to 
firms turning fixed-term 
workers into regular status 
-(KCTU) Adoption of 
specific reasons for the use 
of fixed-term labor 
- Abolition of the duration 
limit on the use of fixed-
term employment 
- Extension of the term limit 
to 4 years 
- Provision of incentives 
(exemption of social 
insurance fee) to small 
firms turning fixed-term 
workers into regular status 
Dispatched - Expanding the 
accountability of employers 
using dispatched labor 
- Opposing the extension of 
duration limit of dispatched 
labor 
-(KCTU) Abolition of the 
dispatched worker law 
- Replacing the current 
Positive List with the 
Negative List to guarantee 
employers’ extended use of 
dispatched labor 
- Extension of the term limit 
to 4 years  
- Expanding the eligible 
sectors for the use of 
dispatched labor by 
revising Ministry Ordinance 
Contracted & 
Dependent 
self-employed 
Labor 
- Introducing statutory 
regulation over in-house 
subcontracting 
- Guaranteeing labor rights 
and social insurance for 
dependent self-employed 
- Opposing any regulation 
on subcontracting and 
dependent self-employed 
- Not accepting any 
regulation on 
subcontracting and 
dependent self-employed 
 
In March 2009, the government announced its revision plan of the non-regular 
employment laws and asked the ruling party, Grand National Party to take an initiative to 
undertake the legislative reform. However, the ruling party, which had concern over growing 
criticism of opposing parties and labor and civil organizations, were reluctant to make a 
proposal of the revised legislation. After all, the government proposed its revision to the 
Congress in late April. Opposing parties (Democratic Party and Democratic Labor Party), 
labor unions (both the KCTU and the FKTU) and a number of civil NGOs, which showed 
divided stances toward the passage of the non-regular employment laws in November 2006, 
has built a unified front to block the government-led revision to deregulate the laws. Even the 
FKTU, which contributed to President Lee’s seizure of power by its policy coalition with the 
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Grand National Party, has made clear its position to oppose the government’s pro-business 
deregulation plan of the non-regular employment laws. Confronted with the strong opposition, 
the ruling party tried to make a compromising proposal to suspend the effect of the two year 
limit for fixed-term workers, rather than extending the term limit to four years, as the 
government demanded. The ruling party’s comprising proposal was refused by opposing 
parties and labor-civil organizations, in that the suspension of the laws has the same effect 
as the government’s revision proposal has in weakening the regulatory force of the laws. In 
June, the National Human Rights Commission delivered its official opinion to oppose the 
government’s revision proposal for the simple reason that this proposal lacked a due 
process of social dialogue and would result in the increase of non-regular employment. 
Moreover, the sudden death of the former President Rho, Moo-Hyun in late May has stirred 
the sharp diffusion of negative public opinion toward the government17, whose targeted 
investigation many people thought is associated with his tragic death. Thus, this unexpected 
political accident further constrained the government and the ruling party from making a 
move to revise the laws. Against the backdrop of the unstable political situation, the 
government and the ruling party try to enforce the passage of the revised non-regular 
employment legislation by convening a special session the Congress, while the opposing 
parties and labor-civil groups show a determined stance to block it by force. As such, the 
contention and uncertainty of labor politics concerning the revision of the non-regular 
employment laws are growing at present. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Against a background of growing labor polarization, the non-regular employment 
legislation in Korea has been a polemic issue of labor politics over the past 10 years. [Table 
7] decomposes the evolution of making the non-regular employment laws into three 
elements – contextual structure, concerned actors’ interests and strategies, and legislative 
outcomes – in accordance with the strategic-relational theoretical perspective, in order to 
shed light on how contested interactions concerning the non-regular employment legislation 
have evolved over the three governments. We can draw some implications from this case 
study, as follows. The legislative processes and the enacted laws are proven the 
materialized cohesion of actors’ strategies and contextual structure. In particular, the making 
 
17 According to a public poll conducted right after the death of President Rho, the approval 
rating of the ruling party fell behind that of the major opposition party, Democratic Party. The 
reversal of the approval rating between the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party is 
for the first time since 2005.    
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of labor laws tends to involve a sharp interest contest between organized labor and 
employers associations. (As delineated in Section IV), the concerned actors get actively 
involved in the making process of labor laws, by taking strategic action to safeguard their 
own interests. The government also takes part in the political interaction of the law-making 
with its ‘strategic selectivity’, as evinced by the legislative approach of the three governments 
in Korea. The interests and strategic measures of the actors, including the government, are 
conditioned and even constrained by contextual situations, particularly economic and 
political circumstances (i.e. economic crisis, political power shift, and changing public 
opinion).  
The contextual structure and the actors’ strategies combine to make the interactive 
processes of law making and their outcomes uncertain and indeterminable. Although the 
government has tried to take the initiative in the making process of non-regular employment 
laws, the final outcomes have not been what it originally intended to make. The 
government’s strategic intention tends to be refracted by the tense policy negotiation 
with/between the concerned actors as well as changing contextual situations. The strategies 
of the actors often expose intra-group interest contest (i.e. fission of strategic approach 
between the FKTU and KCTU, the inter-ministry bargaining), thereby making the interactive 
process of law making more complicated and uncontrolled. Sometimes, unrelated social and 
political issues create an overflowing impact on the legislative process of labor laws moving 
in the unexpected direction. To sum up, the interactive processes concerning the non-regular 
employment laws are characterized as strategic-relational. The non-regular employment 
laws, into which actors’ interests and strategies as well as contextual structure have 
permeated, have a dual nature of employment protection and labor flexibility, which 
dissatisfy both organized labor and business groups. As a consequence, the laws become a 
focal issue of the on-going strategic-relational contest among the concerned parties, thereby 
producing considerable confusion about of their institutional legitimacy.  
 [Table 7] Evolution of Labor Politics concerning Non-regular Employment Legislation  
 Contextual structure Actors’ interest & strategy  Legislative outcomes 
People’s 
Government 
(1998-2002) 
- IMF’s pressure for labor market 
restructuring under economic crisis 
- Experience of labor unions’ 
powerful resistance blocking the 
former government’s legislative 
attempt  
- Political power shift to the liberal 
government 
- Government: forced to enact the dispatched workers law as a 
policy measure to gain the IMF’s relief loan; later, forming the 
policy-consultation process to produce a legislative proposal for 
non-regular labor protection 
- Union: forced to endorse the introduction of the dispatched 
labor law by policy exchange under the crisis; later demanding 
the statutory regulation of non-regular labor 
- Business: consistently demanding reform policy for labor 
market flexibility 
- Enactment of the dispatched 
workers law legalizing the use of this 
employment type 
- Forming the tripartite commission to 
deal with problematic issues of non-
regular employment 
 
Participatory 
Government 
(2003-2007) 
- Growing social concern over labor 
polarization and non-regular labor 
issues  
- Worsening economic performance 
and persistence of the political 
contention, constraining the 
government’s reform drive  
- Weakening public confidence in 
KCTU due to its militancy and 
internal corruption 
- Government: pressured to legislate non-regular labor 
protection, yet desiring to limit the regulation lest firms’ 
competitiveness and labor flexibility should be damaged  
- Union: divided up between the pragmatic (FKTU) and the 
maximalist (KCTU) approaches toward non-regular labor 
protection legislation 
- Business: minimizing the statutory regulation on the use of 
non-regular labor 
- NGO: demanding policy action to resolve non-regular labor 
issues resulting in social polarization  
- Enactment and revision of the non-
regular employment laws, reflecting 
an interest compromise between 
tripartite actors, except KCTU 
- Forming a tripartite commission to 
deal with side-effects of non-regular 
employment laws 
Conservative
Government 
(2008-now) 
- Political power shift to the pro-
business government 
- Outbreak of economic crisis 
- Revival of democratic civil 
movement against the government’s 
self-righteousness  
- Government: pursuing the pro-business labor policy to 
promote labor market flexibility 
- Union & NGOs: having a common ground to fight against the 
retrogressive revision of non-regular labor laws  
- Business: making aggressive demand for deregulatory revision 
of non-regular labor laws 
- Political and discourse contention 
concerning the deregulatory revision 
of non-regular employment laws 
under way 
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